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“Virtual” Contacts
and Patent Cases:
How Should InternetRelated Activity
in Patent Cases
Affect the Personal
Jurisdiction
Analysis?
By Megan M. La Belle
n the 1990s, when the Internet was still considered novel, courts struggled with the question of
how Internet-related contacts should be treated in
the personal jurisdiction analysis. So when Zippo
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Manufacturing v. Zippo DOT Com1 established an
apparently easy-to-apply test for deciding whether
a defendant’s virtual contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdiction, many courts embraced it.2To date,
however, the Federal Circuit has neither adopted nor
rejected the Zippo approach, leaving litigants and lower
courts in patent cases with little guidance on the issue.
Although a recent decision suggests that the Federal
Circuit recognizes the limitations of Zippo,3 it is time
for the court to set forth clear guidelines for analyzing
questions of personal jurisdiction in patent cases when
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are limited to Internet activity.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
I N PAT E N T C A S E S
In patent cases, Federal Circuit law governs
substantive patent law issues, while the law of the
regional circuits generally applies to procedural questions. The Federal Circuit has fashioned an exception, however, when the procedural question is
“intimately involved in the substance of enforcement
of the patent right.”4 Because the Federal Circuit has
determined that questions of personal jurisdiction
fall within these parameters, its law is controlling on
personal jurisdiction.5
Like in other contexts, the test for personal jurisdiction in patent cases involves a two-step inquiry:
(1) Does the forum’s long-arm statute permit service
of process? and (2) Would the exercise of jurisdiction
be inconsistent with due process?6 Because most state
long-arm statutes are co-extensive with the limits
of due process, the two inquiries frequently collapse
into one: whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with due process. Due process allows
defendants to be sued only where they have meaningful “contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state
and thus could reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.7 In other words, a court cannot force a
party to defend a lawsuit in a state unless the defendant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with that
state.
Courts use various tests to determine whether,
in a given case, there have been sufficient minimum contacts to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in the forum state. The nature of conduct
required to meet the “minimum contacts” threshold depends on whether plaintiff asserts a general
25
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or specific jurisdiction theory. To be subject to a
court’s general jurisdiction, the defendant must
have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the
forum state.8 Assuming such contacts exist, courts
may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant with
respect to any type of lawsuit, even if the action
is not related to the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state.
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires
less pervasive contacts between defendant and the
forum state. But under this doctrine, courts are
permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
only if the lawsuit arises out of or is related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.9 In this situation, the “‘relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation,’ is the essential foundation
of in personam jurisdiction.”10
In assessing whether this relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation supports the
exercise of specific jurisdiction in patent cases, courts
consider three factors:
1.
2.
3.

Whether the defendant purposefully directed its
activities at residents of the forum;
Whether the claim arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s activities within the forum; and
Whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is
reasonable and fair.11

The purposeful direction requirement ensures
that parties will not have to defend against lawsuits in
different states based solely on random, fortuitous, or
attenuated contacts or based on the unilateral activity of a third party.12 Yet even a single contact may be
sufficient for specific jurisdiction if it is directly and
substantially related to the plaintiff’s claims.13
Applying this three-part specific jurisdiction test
in patent cases often means that alleged infringers—
most of whom are corporations that engage in interstate and international commerce—are subject to
jurisdiction in practically any federal court in the
country because: (1) the alleged infringer purposefully
directs its activities at residents of the forum state by
selling or offering to sell the accused product there;
(2) the claim—patent infringement—arises out of or
relates to the defendant’s activities within the forum;
and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.14 Questions arise, however, when
the alleged infringer’s products reach the forum state
26
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indirectly, either via the Internet or through more
traditional streams of commerce.
THE STREAM OF COMMERCE
AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Even outside of the Internet context, it is often
the case that a defendant’s only relevant contacts
with a forum state are that its products have been
placed into the stream of commerce and ultimately
sold there. Under those circumstances, the question is whether the forum state may assert jurisdiction over an entity that “delivers its products into
the stream-of-commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state.”15
Unfortunately, the parameters of the stream-ofcommerce doctrine have not been well defined by
the Supreme Court. In Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior
Court, a majority of the justices could not agree as
to the requirements for personal jurisdiction under a
stream-of-commerce theory.16 One opinion, authored
by Justice O’Connor, found that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream-of-commerce, without more,
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State,” and that the requisite
something “more” might be marketing, advertising,
service, or design done with the forum in mind.17
Justice Brennan opined, by contrast, that placing a
product in the stream of commerce with an awareness
“that the final product is being marketed in the forum
State” is all that is necessary to subject a defendant to
jurisdiction.18
While some appellate courts have adopted either
the O’Connor or Brennan approach to stream-ofcommerce jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has not
yet taken a position on the issue.19 In patent infringement cases, therefore, district courts frequently are
forced to look to the law of the regional circuit in
which they sit. Consequently, the law in patent cases
with respect to personal jurisdiction based on the
stream-of-commerce theory is all over the map. In
some states, a defendant will be subject to jurisdiction
because its allegedly infringing product was placed
into the stream of commerce and ultimately reached
the forum state, while placing the product into the
stream of commerce will not suffice for personal jurisdiction in other states. This makes it very difficult, if
not impossible, for patent defendants to regulate their
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behavior and predict where they might be subject
to suit.
THE ZIPPO DECISION
The Zippo case arose in the context of a trademark dispute, but it has had far-reaching implications.
The question in Zippo was whether the defendant, a
California corporation whose principal business was
an Internet news service that allowed Internet users
to access newsgroups through its Web site, was subject
to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff
conceded that the defendant was not subject to general jurisdiction, so the only question was whether its
contacts were sufficient for specific jurisdiction.20
In order for a defendant to be subject to specific
jurisdiction, the cause of action must arise out of or
be related to the defendant’s forum-related conduct.
The court in Zippo found that this requirement was
satisfied since a significant amount of the alleged
trademark infringement and dilution had occurred in
Pennsylvania.21
The more difficult question was whether the
defendant had purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania by engaging in electronic commerce with
residents of that forum. To answer this question, the
court introduced a sliding-scale test that characterizes
virtual contacts as falling into three categories.22 At
one end of the scale are “active” Web sites, which are
used to conduct business transactions. If, for example,
the buyer electronically transmits payment to the
defendant that electronically transmits the purchased
product to the buyer, the Zippo court considered such
conduct “purposeful” for the personal jurisdiction
analysis. At the opposite end of the spectrum are
“passive” Web sites where a defendant simply makes
information available on a site that may be accessed
by residents of other states. According to Zippo, the
maintenance of such a passive Web site does not
satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. Finally,
in the middle of the sliding scale are “interactive”
Web sites, which allow for the exchange of information between the Web site’s host and non-residents,
but where business transactions do not necessarily
occur. Interactive Web sites may or may not subject
the defendant to personal jurisdiction; that depends
on the level of interactivity and the commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on
the site.
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Applying this newly articulated test to the
case before it, the Zippo court concluded that the
Web site at issue was “active” and that defendant
was doing business over the Internet. In particular, approximately 140,000 people worldwide had
subscribed to defendant’s service by completing an
online application and then making an electronic
payment. Defendant then assigned each subscriber
a password that permitted the subscriber to view
and download newsgroup messages stored on the
defendant’s server in California. Of these 140,000
customers, approximately 3,000 were Pennsylvania
residents; moreover, defendant had entered into
agreements with seven Internet service providers
in Pennsylvania to allow these 3,000 customers to
access the new service.
Finally, the Zippo court rejected defendant’s argument that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable given Pennsylvania’s strong interest in
adjudicating trademark disputes involving its residents, the fact that plaintiff chose to seek relief in
Pennsylvania, and the lack of evidence that litigating
in Pennsylvania would impose a significant burden on
defendant. Accordingly, the Zippo court denied the
motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed in
Pennsylvania.
POST-ZIPPO PATENT CASES
Many courts have adopted some permutation
of the Zippo test since it was announced more than
a decade ago. At least in theory, the use of such
a well-defined test should provide some benefits;
namely, it should increase predictability for litigants
and ease the burden on the courts in deciding these
difficult jurisdictional questions. But this one-sizefits-all approach contradicts the Supreme Court’s
mandate that personal jurisdiction be decided on
a case-by-case basis.23 Moreover, many courts have
reflexively followed the Zippo test without regard to
either the basic tenets of the personal jurisdiction
doctrine or the particular factual circumstances of
the case. Thus, in reality, the Zippo test has contributed to the creation of a body of case law on
Internet-related personal jurisdiction that is confusing, inconsistent, and sometimes even inaccurate.
This is particularly problematic in patent cases
where district courts are supposed to follow Federal
Circuit law on personal jurisdiction, but have
27
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resorted to relying on the regional circuit courts for
guidance given the Federal Circuit’s silence on the
issue.
General Jurisdiction vs. Specific Jurisdiction
In Zippo, the court made clear that it was considering only whether defendant was subject to
specific, rather than general, jurisdiction and that
the sliding scale test was applicable to the purposeful availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test.
Nonetheless, a common mistake that district courts
have made is that they have misapplied the Zippo
sliding-scale test to assertions of general jurisdiction. As noted earlier, a court may exercise general jurisdiction when a defendant has continuous
and systematic contacts with the forum state. In
assessing general jurisdiction, courts must consider
all of the defendant’s activities within the forum
state and then determine whether those contacts,
in their totality, essentially equate to “presence”
in the state.24 Thus, the fact that the defendant
maintains a Web site—whether active, passive, or
interactive in nature—should be factored into the
general jurisdiction calculation, but it rarely should
be determinative.
More troubling is the inconsistency among lower courts deciding
patent cases as to the characterization of a Web site as active,
interactive, or passive.
Yet courts often overlook the fact that Zippo
was a specific jurisdiction case and rely on the
sliding-scale test to decide whether a defendant
charged with patent infringement should be subject
to general jurisdiction in the forum state. In Enlink
Geoenergy Services, Inc. v. Jackson & Sons Drilling &
Pump, Inc.,25 for example, the plaintiff patent holder
argued that the alleged infringer was subject to general jurisdiction in California because it maintained
a Web site accessible to California residents that
advertised and displayed the allegedly infringing
products. The court disagreed with plaintiff, holding
that the Web site was merely passive in nature and,
therefore, insufficient to establish general jurisdiction.26 The opinion suggests, however, that the court
might have reached a different result had the Web
site been more interactive.
28
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Active, Interactive, or Passive Web Site
Even more troubling is the inconsistency among
lower courts deciding patent cases as to the characterization of a Web site as active, interactive, or passive.
In these cases, the courts are properly considering
the Zippo sliding-scale test to evaluate whether the
defendant has satisfied the purposeful availment
prong of the specific jurisdiction test; yet their conclusions vary dramatically.
In the first line of cases, courts have interpreted
the purposeful availment requirement rather liberally and have subjected defendants to jurisdiction
even where no Internet sales of the allegedly infringing products have occurred. In O’Donnell v. Animal
Matters, Inc.,27 the patent holder sued for patent
infringement in North Carolina asserting that defendant was subject to jurisdiction as a result of its Web
site. Although defendant did not sell the accused
products over the Internet, its site listed retailers that
sold the products, including two in North Carolina,
along with name and contact information for those
retailers. The court held that this activity amounted
to “purposeful direction” and that exercising jurisdiction based on such virtual contacts would comport
with due process.28
Similarly, in Litmer v. PDQUSA.com,29 the
court held that defendant’s Web site was sufficiently “interactive” to satisfy the purposeful prong
of the specific jurisdiction test. In that case, the
defendant offered the allegedly infringing product
for sale over its Web site, which was accessible in
every state, including Indiana where the patent
holder ultimately sued. Unlike most commercial
Web sites, however, sales could not be completed
over the Web site. Instead, the purchaser would
provide certain information over the Internet, such
as name, address, and number of products that it
wished to order, and then the seller would follow
up with a telephone call to collect payment. The
court nevertheless concluded that, under the Zippo
test, the Web site was highly interactive and that
defendant’s activities “were purposefully directed at
other forums, including Indiana.”30
At the opposite end of the spectrum are the
courts in the second line of cases. These courts have
held that selling goods over the Internet does not necessarily subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the
purchaser, even when that sale gave rise to the cause
of action. In Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Products,31
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for example, plaintiff brought a patent infringement action in Maryland against Vitamin Research
Products (VPR), a Nevada corporation that was selling a dietary supplement over the Internet that allegedly infringed plaintiff’s patent. It was undisputed
that VPR operated a commercial Web site and that
at least two Maryland residents had purchased the
accused products through that site. But the court
held that such contacts did not amount to purposeful
availment because “[n]othing on VPR’s website suggests that VPR intended to target Maryland residents
any more than it intended to target residents of other
states.”32
The time has come for the Federal
Circuit to take a position and
explain to lower courts how
Internet-related activity should
affect the personal jurisdiction
analysis in patent cases.
The Shamsuddin court seemed to require “something more” for jurisdiction just like Justice O’Connor
did in Asahi with respect to the more traditional
stream of commerce. And in recent years, several
other district courts presiding over patent cases have
imposed this “something more” or “targeting” requirement in order for a Web site to subject a defendant
to personal jurisdiction.33 These courts posit, in
other words, that “[c]reating a site, like placing a
product into the stream-of-commerce, may be felt
nationwide—or even worldwide—but, without more,
it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum
state.”34
Finally, in the third line of cases, which can be
seen as a sort of middle ground, courts have held that
a defendant purposefully avails itself by maintaining
a Web site through which it has sold the allegedly
infringing products to residents of the forum state.
In 3M Company v. Mohan,35 for example, defendant
Pradeep Mohan, a California resident, was selling
his line of stethoscopes on various Internet sites.
Plaintiff 3M Company believed that the stethoscopes
infringed its patents and sued Mohan in district
court in Minnesota, contending that he was subject
to specific jurisdiction there. The court found that
Mohan had sold the allegedly infringing products to
Minnesota residents over the Internet and that those
sales totaled approximately $400 or 2 percent of his
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Web sales.36 The court then determined that these
sales, albeit minimal, were sufficient for purposeful
availment under Zippo.
Several other district courts have followed the
Mohan line of reasoning in patent cases.37 For example,
in Tristrata Technology, Inc. v. Emulgen Laboratories,
Inc.,38 the defendant conducted a nationwide email
campaign to advertise the allegedly infringing products. As a result of this campaign, defendant received
orders from and shipped the accused products to
four Delaware residents. After being sued for patent
infringement in Delaware, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground
that it should not be subject to specific jurisdiction
in Delaware because its sales there were de minimis. The court rejected this argument, explaining
that, “[b]ecause [defendant’s] forum-related conduct
forms the basis of the injuries alleged by [plaintiff],
[defendant’s] contacts do not need to be continuous
and substantial.”39 In sum, courts in this third line of
cases have held that, “where a defendant infringer is
shown to have sold the allegedly infringing product
in the forum state, the forum may exercise personal
jurisdiction over defendant.”40
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A N D I N T E R N E T- R E L AT E D
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The previous discussion demonstrates some of
the inconsistencies that have arisen in patent cases
with respect to Internet-related personal jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in order to
avoid such problems; it was to bring uniformity and
consistency to our patent system. Yet, despite the
frequency with which personal jurisdiction is challenged in patent cases and despite that district courts
have been grappling with this question for many years
now, the Federal Circuit has failed to provide clear
guidance on this issue. As discussed in this section,
the time has come for the Federal Circuit to take a
position and explain to lower courts how Internetrelated activity should affect the personal jurisdiction
analysis in patent cases.
TRINITEC
In a recent decision, Trinitec Industries, Inc. v.
Pedre Promotion Products, Inc., the Federal Circuit
29
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considered whether a defendant should be subject to
personal jurisdiction based on virtual contacts. In that
case, though, the analysis focused on the long-arm
statute, not on the question whether the exercise of
jurisdiction would comport with federal due process.
Nevertheless, the Trinitec opinion is relevant because
it provides some insight as to how the Federal Circuit
might rule when confronted with this issue head on.
In Trinitec, the plaintiffs sued a New York corporation for patent infringement in the District of
Columbia. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction on the ground that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate both the District
of Columbia long-arm statute and due process.
With respect to the long-arm statute, plaintiffs had
to demonstrate either that the claims arose from
defendant’s transacting business in the District of
Columbia or that the defendant had caused tortious
injury in the District.
To demonstrate that defendant was transacting business in the District, plaintiff pointed to
defendant’s Web site on which it was advertising and
selling the allegedly infringing products. The Federal
Circuit acknowledged that, some cases, including
Zippo, “have suggested that the availability and use of
a highly interactive, transaction-oriented website . . .
by itself may support long-arm jurisdiction wherever
the site is available to potential customers for the
purpose of doing business.”41 In this case, however,
the court concluded that the existence of a Web
site alone, even a commercial one, is insufficient
to prove that defendant was transacting business in
the District of Columbia because “the website is not
directed at customers in the District of Columbia, but
instead is available to all customers throughout the
country who have access to the Internet.”42
Nor was the Trinitec court able to determine
whether defendant had caused tortious injury in the
District via its Internet activity. It is well established
that the sale of an infringing product within a forum
causes tortious injury there since patent infringement
is a tort. But in this case, plaintiff merely established
that defendant maintained a Web site capable of selling infringing products to residents of the District, not that
any District residents had ever actually purchased
the accused products over the Web site. This was not
enough, in the court’s opinion, to satisfy the tortious
injury provision of the long-arm statute that required
actual sales to District residents.
30
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Under these circumstances, the Trinitec court held
that the record was not sufficient to decide whether
the District of Columbia long-arm statute was satisfied, so it remanded the case for further proceedings.
The court never discussed the due process portion of
the personal jurisdiction analysis. Indeed, the court
explicitly stated that it was expressing no opinion as
to whether the exercise of jurisdiction in this case
would be constitutional. As discussed later, however,
Trinitec may very well foreshadow the approach the
Federal Circuit is likely to take with respect to the
due process inquiry of the personal jurisdiction test.
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
The Federal Circuit has so far refused to take a
position with respect to two very important issues
related to personal jurisdiction that arise in patent
cases: (1) whether a defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction because the accused products reached the
forum state through the stream-of-commerce, and
(2) whether a defendant subjects itself to jurisdiction
by maintaining an interactive Web site accessible
in the forum state. These issues are closely related,
and patent litigants and lower courts certainly need
guidance on both. This article, however, focuses on
the latter and explores the Federal Circuit’s likely
approach to questions of Internet-related personal
jurisdiction.

Trinitec may very well foreshadow
the approach the Federal Circuit is
likely to take with respect to the
due process inquiry of the personal jurisdiction test.
Although the Federal Circuit’s delay in addressing this jurisdictional question has caused frustration
and confusion, the flip side is that the Federal Circuit
will have the benefit of substantial case law and commentary when it ultimately resolves the split among
the lower courts. Thus, the Federal Circuit should be
able to avoid some of the mistakes that other courts
have made in this context, such as misapplying Zippo
to general jurisdiction and treating the Zippo test as
a categorical rule. Rather, the Federal Circuit likely
understands by now that the Zippo sliding-scale
analysis should be used only in the specific jurisdiction context “as a tool to determine the purposeful
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availment of a defendant to a forum.”43 So the Federal
Circuit’s first priority should be to make this clear for
lower courts and litigants.
But even assuming that courts understand that
Zippo applies only in the specific jurisdiction context,
other questions about Internet-related jurisdiction
need to be resolved. In a typical patent infringement
case where jurisdiction is based on Internet activity,
the patent owner contends that the defendant is
subject to jurisdiction because it was offering to sell
the allegedly infringing products over the Internet,
including to residents of the forum state. Thus, the
question for the Federal Circuit will be whether
those types of virtual contacts—namely, offering to
sell the infringing products on a Web site accessible
nationwide—amount to purposeful availment.

Trinitec suggests that the court
would be loathe to find that merely
maintaining a Web site advertising
the accused product amounts to
purposeful availment.
Like the lower courts, the Federal Circuit will
have three options for tackling this problem. First, it
could interpret the purposeful availment requirement
liberally, so that maintaining a Web site that offers to
sell the accused products by itself would support jurisdiction. This is similar to Justice Brennan’s approach
in the traditional stream-of-commerce context where
placing a product in the stream of commerce with
an awareness that the final product could be sold in
the forum state is all that is necessary to subject the
defendant to jurisdiction.
Second, the Federal Circuit could decide that
a Web site offering to sell the allegedly infringing
products is not enough for jurisdiction. Instead, the
plaintiff would have to show that the defendant
actually sold those products over the Internet to
residents of the forum state. Of course, it is important to note in this regard that jurisdiction cannot be
manufactured. For example, a plaintiff who resides
in California and wants to sue in New York cannot
arrange for his New York-based attorney to purchase
the allegedly infringing product and then claim that
jurisdiction should be based on that single sale to a
New York resident.44
Third, the Federal Circuit could follow a
more restrictive approach to jurisdiction requiring
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“something more” than Internet sales of the accused
products to residents of the forum state. The court
might, for instance, require the defendant to “target”
forum residents in some way, such as by advertising in
the state or designing its products specifically for that
state’s residents.45 This approach resembles Justice
O’Connor’s in Asahi where she held that placing a
product in the stream of commerce, without more, is
insufficient for purposeful availment.
So, which of these approaches is the Federal
Circuit likely to take? And perhaps more importantly,
is that the approach that the Federal Circuit should
take? Because of Trinitec we know something about
the way that the Federal Circuit (or, more accurately,
one panel of the court) is thinking about some of
these issues. Trinitec suggests that the court would be
loathe to find that merely maintaining a Web site
advertising the accused product amounts to purposeful availment since it concluded that such a Web site
was insufficient to satisfy the “transacting business”
prong of the D.C. long-arm statute. Instead, when
a defendant’s Web site is its only contact with the
forum state and there’s no evidence that any actual
sales of the accused products have been made, the
Federal Circuit will probably require some additional
proof that defendant directed its site at residents of
the forum in question.
It is a bit more difficult to predict how the
Federal Circuit might rule when the defendant’s Web
site does not target the forum, but actual sales of the
allegedly infringing product have been made to only
a few forum residents. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the exercise of specific
jurisdiction may be supported by a single contact
as long as it was related or gave rise to plaintiff’s
cause of action.46 This prerequisite would appear to
be satisfied in patent infringement cases since the
single contact—the sale of an allegedly infringing
product—would be directly and substantially related
to plaintiff’s claim for patent infringement.
In Trinitec, however, the court implied that a
single sale may not be enough to show that defendant was “transacting business” in the District of
Columbia.47 Specifically, the court said: “Although
Trinitec has shown that Pedre’s websites contain some
interactive features aimed at transacting business, it is
unclear how frequently those features are utilized or,
indeed, whether any District residents have ever actually used Pedre’s website to transact business.”48 Thus,
31
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if the court believes that sales to only a few forum
residents would be insufficient to satisfy the long-arm
statute, then it may similarly conclude that such limited sales do not amount to purposeful availment for
due process purposes.
For courts that have adopted either Justice
Brennan’s or Justice O’Connor’s approach to streamof-commerce jurisdiction, the decision as to Internet
jurisdiction may appear to be a simple one. If “something more” is required under the stream-of-commerce
theory, then there also must be “something more” for
a Web site to subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction. Conversely, in a jurisdiction following Justice
Brennan as to the stream-of-commerce theory, the
courts may very well adopt a more liberal approach
with respect to the Internet as well.
Unlike most of the regional circuit courts, however, the Federal Circuit has not yet taken a position
on the stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdiction; thus, it cannot simply transpose that rule to the
Internet context. Interestingly, this places the Federal
Circuit in an advantageous position because the court
will write on a clean slate. So, in deciding which
approach to follow, the Federal Circuit should consider
that, although similarities between the traditional
stream-of-commerce and Internet-based jurisdiction
certainly exist, there are important distinctions too.
With respect to the traditional theory, the defendant places its products into the stream of commerce,
those products make their way to the forum state,
and then eventually are sold in the forum state by a
third party. In the Internet context, by contrast, the
defendant itself creates a Web site and the defendant
itself sells those products over the Internet to residents of the forum state. Since the purposeful availment requirement is satisfied when the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state “proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself that create a
substantial connection with the forum State,”49 there
is a much stronger basis for exercising jurisdiction
over defendants who sell their products directly over
the Internet than those who place products into the
stream of commerce that eventually are sold in the
forum state by a third party.
Finally, in choosing an approach, the Federal
Circuit should be mindful of the particular nature
of specific jurisdiction. In the general jurisdiction
context, it is the quantity of defendant’s contacts that
matters, that is, are the defendant’s contacts with the
32
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forum state continuous and systematic? With respect
to specific jurisdiction, though, the focus is on the
quality of the contacts, namely, did the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state give rise to the cause
of action? As the Federal Circuit itself has acknowledged, “even a single contact with a forum state may
suffice for personal jurisdiction if it is directly and
substantially related to the plaintiff’s claim.”50 Thus,
the fact that an alleged patent infringer sold only a
few of the accused items in the forum state should not
be relevant to specific jurisdiction. The question the
Federal Circuit should be asking is whether those contacts gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim. In patent cases,
where the contact is the sale of allegedly infringing
products and the cause of action is patent infringement, the court likely will be able to answer that question in the affirmative, which means the defendant
usually will be subject to specific jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction questions, particularly those
concerning Internet-related contacts, arise frequently
in patent infringement actions. Federal Circuit law
is supposed to govern personal jurisdiction in patent
cases, but so far the Federal Circuit has said very little
about Internet-related jurisdiction. As a result, lower
courts are sharply divided as to the relevance of Zippo
in patent cases, and potential defendants are left
guessing whether their conduct might subject them
to jurisdiction in a particular forum.
This is not to suggest that the Federal Circuit
should adopt a bright-line rule regarding Internetrelated jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has eschewed
such definitive rules and has mandated that personal
jurisdiction be decided on a case-by-case basis.51 Yet,
given the current inconsistent and confusing state of
the law in patent cases, the Federal Circuit needs to
provide lower courts and litigants some guidance as
to the impact of virtual contacts on personal jurisdiction generally and the Zippo sliding-scale test in
particular.
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